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I

t seems there are two types of international lawyers-those who view apparent
legal voids as vacuums to be filled by international law and those who view legal
voids as barriers to the operation of international law. Voids. and for that matter
ambiguity, provoke different reactions from diffe rent international lawyers. How
an international lawyer or tribunal regards an apparent legal void may be, to borrow a poker term, one of the great international law "tells." In addition to providing doctrinal or descriptive darity, resolutions of voids usually expose a lawyer's
level of confidence in the international legal system as well as his or her outlook on
the propriety of sovereignty-based regulation.
Disagreement over the significance of international legal voids is not merely academic. To the contrary, debate over perceived or real legal voids between international law interpretive camps quickly brings questions of abstract legal theory
into the practical worlds of international policy and practice. Even the hardened
international- rule skeptic must see that States' conceptions of international law
translate almost directly into policy. I With respect to the international law of war,
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Status of Government Forces in Non-International Anned Conflict
such interpretations can produce widespread life-or-death consequences and,
with the rebirth of international criminal law, severe criminal sanctions.
Legal voids exist and operate nowhere more clearly and widely in international
law than in the laws of war applicable to non-international armed conflicts
(NIACs), understood classically as civil wars.2 In purely quantitative terms, the
positive law ofNlAC pales in comparison to the law-of-war provisions applicable
to conflicts between States.3 For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, including
their 1977 updates, contain well over five hundred substantive articles applicable
to international armed conflict ( lAC) ~ yet fewer than thirty applicable to NIAC
There is thus no small irony in the fact that the modern law of war actually traces
its beginning to a document created to regulate conduct in a civil war. S Yet ever
since, States have rejected invitations and proposals to level the positive legal gap
between lAC and NlAC. The resu1t has been what some regard as glaring legal
voids regarding the latter.6
Status of government actors in NIAC provides an intriguing and specific example of just such a void. Whereas the protections and obligations of the law of lAC
are premised almost entirely on the status of affected persons, the law of NlAC
spurns such classifications, as well as the lAC taxonomy of stat us-based protection
generally. International lawyers have long regarded status of persons as largely irrelevant to NIAC.1 Yet modern forms of conflict and State responses may soon
place pressure on the NlACstatus void. Increasing media attention, growing international oversight and progressively heightening sensitivity to the suffering produced by NlAC conspire to match the legal protective regime ofNlAC with that of
lAC, including perhaps the latter's use of status.
Status in lAC describes a number of circwnstances and legal relationships (e.g.,
wounded, wounded at sea, prisoner-of-war, or civilian status). This chapter
focuses on the use of status to determine lawfulness of participation in hostilities,
or what is sometimes referred to in lAC as combatant status.s ln particular, this
chapter explores the extent to which the international law ofN IAC regulates the
status of persons who participate in hostilities on behalf of the State.
This chapter begins by addressing the descriptive question whether the internationallaw ofNlAC speaks to government forces' status at all. An analytical section
accompanies, offering explanations of the likely influences behind the state of the
law. A predictive effort follows, addressed to the question whether the law is settled or instead like1y to change. This section identifies a number of pressures conspiring to fill the NIAC status void. An argument in favor of imposing status-like
limitations on government forces in NlAC is derived from the law-of-war principle
of distinction, and then rebutted by logical, structural and operational arguments.
The chapter concludes by addressing a series of considerations related to the chapter's
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opening generalization about international legal voids as an opportunity to reflect
more deliberately on an appropriate interpretive approach to the law ofNIAC.

The International Legal Status of Government Forces in NIAC
The law of war is riddled with categories--<ategories of conflicts,9 categories of
weapons,IOcategories of persons. With respect to persons, the primary byproduct
of these categories is an elaborate system of status for individuals participating, or
caught up, in armed conflict. Principled application of the law requires a deep understanding of how the law of war employs status. 11 Just as the law of war confers
status to implement its humanitarian goals, the law's denial of status often produces disappointing or even inhumane results. Frequently, the complexities and
nuances of status seem to frus trate alignment oflegally correct outcomes with intuitively moral or normatively desirable outcomes. A great many of the present and
past errors in the application of the law of war are attributable either to fail ure to
understand how status attaches and operates in armed conflict or simply to unwillingness to accept the practical consequences of correct status determinations. 12
In war between States, status plays out primarily in the allocation of the
protections and obligations of the law of war. Nearly every important protection of
the law of lAC requires a predicate detennination of the status of persons seeking
protection. l1 A prominent commentator observed with respect to lAC, "Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law ... ; nobody in
enemy hands can be outside the law."14 In most cases, protection from intentional
targeting requires the status of civilian,ls that of wounded person l6 or, generally,
that of hors de combat. Persons qualifying for wounded or civilian status receive
protection from attack "unless and for such time as they take direct part in
hostilities."11 To benefit from the most elaborate law-of-war treatment obligations, persons in the hands of an adversary must qualify for wounded and sick,18
prisoner-of-war I9 or protected-person status. 20 The 1949 Geneva Convention on
Civilians includes subcategories of civilian, including the "populations of countries
in conflict,"21 "nationa1[sl of neutral state[s],,22 and "interned protected persons. "23 The law further classifies members of the armed forces into subcategories
of combatant and non-combatant. 24
In addition to allocating protection, the law of war uses status to deny protection and treatment obligations. Designation as a spy, mercenary, or, somewhat
more controversially, an unprivileged belligerent, unlawful combatant, saboteur
or guerilla can greatly reduce or alter a person's protection or treatment under the
law ofwar. 25 Status has been the focus of not only operational, humanitarian and
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academic attention but also some of the most significant criminal litigation to enforce the law of war. 26
The law ofNlAC, however, stands generally as an exception to law-of-war reliance on status. Whereas the legal regime applicable to lAC is replete with categories
of status, no such system or taxonomy operates in the law ofNlAC The traditional
response to the question whether international law regulates status in NIAC has
been a confident no.27 While Additional Protocol II of 1977, the most developed
treaty law applicable in NIAC, speaks in terms of a "civilian population," it offers
neither qualifying criteria nor any definition of the term "civilian. "2$ Perhaps more
significantly, the Protocol offers no counterpart to civilian status such as the Additional Protocol I status of combatant.29
To the uninitiated, the most noticeable legal void ofNlAC might be the absence
of prisoner-of-war status . Along with protection of the wounded and sick,
prisoner-of-war status has long been one of the consummate law-of-war topics. 30
Few of the major law-of-war treaties addressed to the protection of victims of
armed conflict have failed to address prisoners of war. While treatment provisions and living conditions of the captured garner the lion's share of popular attention, the most important aspect of prisoner-of-war protection has been
immunity from prosecution for lawful hostile acts-so-called combatant immunity. Combatant immunity protects most prisoners of war from prosecution by
their captors for mere participation in hostilities. 3l Thus, nearly alllaw-of-war
prosecutions of prisoners of war have concerned the manner in which they conducted hostilities rather than the fact of their participation in war or their otherwise lawful, warlike acts.
Fighters32 captured in NIAC do not share the status, immunity or regime of
treatment obligations afforded to their lAC counterparts. H Despite development
of a separate protocol dedicated to developing humanitarian protection in NIAC,
the law of war affords no prisoner-of-war status in NIAC34 States' desire to avoid
attachment of status in NlAC is perhaps apparent in the Additional Protocol II label
for the captured, "[ pJersons whose liberty has been restricted."35 This is a strained
label, even by international legal standards; it is likely States wished to avoid any
implications of status or legitimacy arising from use of a term of art to describe detention in NIAC The international law of NIAC affords captured fighters treatment obligations no different from those applicable to the general, non-hostile
population.36 Neither efforts to comply with criteria of conduct or appearance nor
any offer of reciprocal observance of the law can compel recognition of prisonerof-war status by a captor during NIAC. 37 Instead, opposition fighters captured in
NIAC, no matter their appearances or conduct, are likely to be regarded as mere
criminals, fully subject to the domestic penal regime of the territorial State.38 The
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nearest comment Additional Protocol II offers on the topic of combatant immunity is Article 6(5).39 However, this provision merely charges States to "endeavor"
to grant amnesty to fighters. Amnesty is by no means an international lcgal obligation in NIAC Domestic law represents the far more relevant legal source for both
treatment obligations and immunities if any arising from participation in NIAC
The law ofNIAC is nearly silent.
The NIAC status void is even more pronounced with respect to the status of
government actors in NIAC Investigation reveals no treatment in relevant treaty
law, nor any significant international custom or usage on the topic. The wellknown criteria used to evaluate combatant stat us in lAC appear nowhere in the
positive law of NlAC40 And while some States' military manuals address NIAC,
none of those reviewed acknowledges international legal input to government
forces' status.4 ! Instead, most emphasize that the existing lawofNIAChas no effect
on the legal status of the parties to the conflict.42 Finally, there is there no evidence
of internationally based prosecutions of government actors for their mere participation in NlAC or based on the nature or composition of such forces.
States thus appear to be free from international regulation of the status or
nature of government actors they employ against rebels in NIAC Although States
have created rules regulating the conduct of their forces in N1AC, no positive international rules limit the nature of persons or organizations governments may
employ in N1AC Nor does the law of NIAC provide any general status for such
forces . In fact, government forces' status in NIAC generally can be said to constitute one of the remaining voids of the international laws of war. Three explanations for this void seem apparent: one practical, a second probable and a third
speculative but possible.
The most practical explanation may be that there has simply been little need .
Government actors involved in NIAC have not looked to international law for the
legitimacy of their participation or for their legal mandate to carry out acts that are
essentially internal or non-international in character. Actions taken to defend the
State from internal threats lie at the heart of sovereignty. Even the highly internationalized collective security system of the United Nations includes a barrier to
outside intervention in internal conflicts.43 The nature and status of government
forces used in NIAC has been an area dominated by municipal law. Responses to
insurgency or rebellion, though typically of greater intensity than routine crime,
remain essentially law enforcement operations.""
There are lively debates concerning domestic legal status and participation in
hostilities-none more timely and relevant than the U.S. Title to-Title SO division
of national security authority.4S Conceptions of U.S. domestic law might well restrict authority to engage in combat to the armed forces as organized under Title 10
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of the United States Code. Although likely envisioned in extraterritorial contexts,
debate also swirls around permissible roles for private security contractors (PSCs)
in armed conflict. Episodes such as the Blackwater Nisoor Square shootings46 and
other examples of excessive use of force by PSCs have fos tered efforts to restrain
them from direct participation in hostilities.~ 1 Proposals to limit PSC activities appear to have gained momentum, notwithstanding the considerable economies that
have developed around that corner of the military-industrial complex. Clearly,
States may resort to domestic law to limit the activities of their agents in armed
conflict. The question remains apart, however, from whether they have resorted or
will resort to international law to do the same.
To be certain , government actors may very well find themselves called to task
for the international legality of specific conduct and means and methods used in
combat.48 International criminal tribunals of the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries have developed the NIAC jus i" bello through extensive cases. Yet
the legality of their mere participation in NIAC itself has not been addressed in
any forum applying international law.
A related fac tor contradicting indications of international legal treatment of status may be that States have tended to use fo rces practically appropriate to the task,
that is, armed forces. When the activities of opposition figh ters reach a scale or level
of intensity sufficient to cross the threshold fro m mere banditry or riot into armed
conflict, resort by the government to the armed fo rces of the State becomes an obvious, often necessary response. Indeed, forcing the State to resort to armed forces
is often regarded as a condition precedent to classifying a situation as armed confli ct in the first place. 49
By contrast, the prevailing view of the law of lAC seems to limit the types of
forces States may employ as direct participants in hostilities while preserving the
protections of the combatant class, most obviously prisoner-of-war status.soTo expect prisoner-of-war status for their forces upon capture, it is generally agreed that
States must employ regular armed forces or their equivalent in direct hostilities.51 If
this view is correct and ifone extends it by custom to NlAC then it's likely the case,
as the late Louis Henkin might say, that most States are in compliance, most of the
time. 52 Thus the problem, if there is one at all, may frequently be preempted by
supposed compliance.
A second, highly probable explanation for why international law does not explicitly regulate status of government actors in NlAC concerns States' general attitudes toward the relationship between international law and NIAC. States have
steadfastly resisted creating parity between the law of lAC and that of NIAC. It is
likely the absence of international law is simply a byproduct of States' general reluctance to commit to positive rules in NIAC. The reasons fo r this reluctance are by
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now well known. Fear of conferring legitimacy on rebels, concerns over failure of
reciprocal obselVance,53 fear of limiting operational freedom of action and fear of
erecting obstacles to domestic prosecutions of persons who take up arms against
the State have all driven States to resist expanding the law ofNIAC to match that of
lAC States simply do not view opposition fighters in NIAC as legal equals.
Equality of status between sanctioned combatants has long been bedrock of the
international law ofIAC Indeed, equality before the law has been a distinguishing
feature ofthe jus in bello, setting it apart from its law-of-war counterpart, the jus ad
bellum. Yet no "equal application" principle operates in the present lawofNlACS-4
Indeed, States conditioned their consent to what little positive law of NIAC exists
on an explicit guarantee that legal status would form no part of the law. 55 The concluding clause of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention provides,
"The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the
Parties to the conflict. "56
The point is made again when one looks to the law of lAC Even in its current,
highly developed state, the law of lAC does not fully regulate the status of government forces. The concept of combatant status has ancient law-of-war rootsY Yet
the positive law does not directly address or commit to this area. The Third Geneva
Convention does not address combatant status, or im munity for that matter, at
all-surprising, perhaps, for a prisoner-of-war convention comprising over 130
articles.
Building on the Third Convention, Additional Protocol I of 1977 states that
combatants "have the right to participate directly in hostilities" and is likely reflective of custom. Yet this commitment represents only a partial comment on the issue of combatant stat us. For instance, the relevant article does not affirmatively
indicate whether combatants' right to participate in hostilities is exclusive. Thus it
is unclear whether international law actually proscribes or even regulates participation in hostilities by persons not qualifying as combatants. Most law-of-war experts m ight posit that the right is exclusive to combatants but the soundest view is
that international law is merely silent on the matter of privilege with respect to
civilians. The matter is not committed to international law whatsoever. It is left to
State prerogative and hence to municipal law. Additional Protocol I, Article 51(3),
which merely outlines the targeting consequences of civilian participation , is the
most the law of lAC offers on the topic. S8
Commentary indicates the Additional Protocol I drafters intended to codify and
clarify international custom on the point of combatant privilege. 59 Still, experts
debate what exactly that article and the law of lAC do for combatants in terms of
authority. Some describe international law of armed conflict (LOAC) asa source of
authority to participate in hostilities-a combatant's privilege.60 Others disagree,
151

Status of Government Forces in Non-International Anned Conflict
characterizing the article as merely immunity-insulation from prosecutionrather than an affirmative grant of authority, a right or pennission.61 The better
phrasing may be that the article merely prohibits prosecutions rather than constitutes affirmative authority or positive sanction. Notwithstanding contrary interpretations by the 2009 United States Congress and the mid-twentieth-century U.S.
Supreme Court, the majority view is that the law of lAC does not concern itself
with the question of criminal consequences for mere direct participation in
hostilities.62 The best view is that lAC regulates combatant status only as an instrumentality-a means to effecting other ends, such as treatment upon capture or for
purposes of contrast with persons protected from attack.
The point fo r purposes of this chapter is that States' apparent reluctance to commit combatant status fully to international law in lAC makes the prospect that they
would do so in NIAC extremely unlikely. Nothing even approaching the partial
coverage offered by Additional Protocol I appears in Additional Protocol II . Nor
do any of the usual indicators of customary norms, such as military manuals or
statements of opinio juris, indicate any State commitment of combatant status in
NIAC to international law.
A final and possible reason fo r NIAC's void concerning government actor legal
status is lack of consensus. The details of how to treat NIAC have long split the
authors of internationallaw. 63 Balancing the competing interests of humanity and
respect for sovereignty has bogged down nearly every law-of-war treaty diplomatic
conference. But this balance has been particularly elusive with respect to NIAC
Both Common Article 3 to the 1949 Conventions and Additional Protocol II
proved to be especially contentious on topics as fundamental as the definition of
military objective. 64 Each instrument generated highly divisive fact ions at its respective diplomatic conference.6s
For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions diplomatic conference generated a
lengthy report on the scope of NIAC. 66 Consensus that the Conventions would
only operate in conflicts analogous to classic civil war required fiftee n weeks of
work and twenty-three meetings on NIAC,67 Later, at the diplomatic conference
that produced the 1977 Additional Protocols, the scope of covered NIAC again
proved contentious. Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of delegations appeared
more concerned with contracting LOAC rather than expanding it to cover the entire range of NlAC68 These delegations scored a partial victory in the comparatively stingy application provisions of Protocol II. It is generally agreed that
Protocoill applies to a narrower class of conflicts than its 1949 counterpart, Common
Article 3.69 Thus, while there may well be a faction of States who, given the opportunity, would consent to international regu1ation of government forces' status in NlAC,
they seem not to have garnered sufficien t support at major treaty conferences. 70
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In the final analysis it is overwhelmingly apparent that States have not made any
clear commitment of the issue of government forces' status in NIAC to internationallaw. Considerations including lack of necessity, general reluctance to yield
sovereignty over internal affairs and lack of consensus have all contributed to the
NIAC legal void. Yet given evolving notions of the formation of international law,
including the law of war, the staying power of this void may be in doubt.
Pressures on the Existing NIAC Framework

A host of developments call into question whether government actor status in
NlAC will remain unregulated by international law. First, if, as argued above,'l
States have previously evaded international regulation of the status of their forces
in NIAC because they have largely conformed to what some regard as limits applicable in lAC, this may not hold true much longer. It seems the threats posed by
modern insurgencies and hostile non-State actors are steadily provoking more
comprehensive responses from States than previously. Leveraging technology, social media and increasingly open borders, States appear to resort to a broader spectrum of national power to counter today's non-State actors. Modern strategy and
tactics feature informational and economic elements of State power almost as
prominently as more traditional military and diplomatic elements in countering
current threats. n
Although intelligence work has always played an important part in armed confli ct, modern NIAC appears to place even greater emphasis on intelligence gathering. Insurgencies and terrorist groups have frustrated many traditional intelligence
collection practices by operating as diffuse networks rather than as rigid "command and control" organizations. To counter these adaptations, national intelligence assets outside the Department of Defense appear to provide not just strategic
and operational assessments but also tactical-level intelligence used in small-unit
engagements. Civilian intelligence assets appear to provide tactical operators detailed, constantly updated information on enemy locations and activities far more
analogous to that provided by reconnaissance spotters and scouts than to the
templated, prepackaged and static information previously provided.73
The involvement of intelligence community actors in the recent operation
against Osama bin Laden provoked not only questions concerning the lawfulness
of the operation but interest in the status of the various actors and agencies
involved. Reports indicate that in addition to special operations members, Central lntelligence Agency personnel were deeply involved in preparations for and
conduct of the raid.74 Defending the operation on PBS Newshour. the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency explained the mission as a so-called "'title 50'
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operation, which is a covert operation. "7S Elaborating, the Director explained that
he commanded the mission but that "the real commander" was the Com mander
of Joint Special Operations Command, a component of the armed forces.16 Although his motives fo r the characterization were unclear, it would not be unreasonable to detect some effort to fend off allegations that civilian participation in a
military operation would have been illegal. Although agency lawyers might have
later advised him otherwise, particularly given the non-international nature of
the conflict with al-Qaeda,n the Director's response reveals at least intuitive or
implied concern for the impact participation in hostilities might have on the status
of his personnel.
Similar intermingling of the missions and assets o f the military and civilian
intelligence communities is apparent in the growing use of aerial drones. 78 Initially
conceived as intelligence-gathering platforms, drones are now capable of carrying
out highly lethal and destructive kinetic attacks.79 Reports indicate the U.S. armed
forces are not the sole operators of the nation's arsenal oflethal drones. so Intelligence organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency own and "pilot"
drones capable of attack operations, providing a compelling example of blurred
lines between intelligence activities and conduct of hostilities. Moreover, the
United States no longer holds a monopoly on lethal drone technology, if indeed it
ever held one. States such as Israel, China and France are reported to possess lethal
drones, broadening the scope of involved international actors.! l Although perhaps
only now in its infancy, drone use has already provoked intense legal debate. The
majority of debate currently concerns authority for States to use lethal force
outside the traditional confines of battlefields. 82 Yet strains of debate concerning
the authority of non-military personnel to participate in hostilities are gaining
momentum. 83
Further intermingling of government civilian and military communities is envisioned in emerging mid- and postwar nation-building doctrine. An outgrowth
of admitted failures in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, stability operations seek
to build government capacity either to hasten or to sustain transitions from war to
peace.84 Stability operations emphasize "soft power" such as education, agricultural, econom ic and humanitarian assistance to address the deeper causes of
armed conflict. Consistent with popular notions of the "three-block war," stability
operations may occur at the same time as, and very near, active hostilities. 8s In
2005, stability operations received a high-powered endorsement in the form of a
Department of Defense directive.1I6 The directive instructed all U.S. commanders
to give stability operations "priority comparable to combat operations."87 Yet the
centerpiece of military stability operations doctrine is the conviction that the
armed fo rces must perform only a supporting role. Stability operations envision
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heavy, often lead-agency roles for civilian governmental organizations such as the
U.S. Department of State, Department of}ustice and the U.S. Agency for International Development. sa While actual civilian agency participation has lagged behind expectations, stability operations that intermingle civilian and military
missions, particularly in complex or dynamic security environments, seem on the
rise and likely to blur notions of participation in hostilities. 89
A final emerging field of warfare also illustrates the intermingling of agencies
provoked by modern armed conflict. States increasingly recognize cyberspace as a
critical domain of national security.90 Few steeped in this evolving form of conflict
are unfamiliar with stories of empty legal formalism with respect to personnel involved in cyber operations. Informal discussions of practices associated with State
involvement in cyber operations frequently recall stories of the uniformed service
member who clicks "$end" at the conclusion of a cyber operation otherwise prepared, designed, scouted and executed exclusively by civilian personnel. Although
off-the-record and susceptible to exaggeration, no doubt, the anecdote may be indicative of both the extent of civilian participation in U.S. cyber operations up to
and likely including the moment of attack, and ingrained or intuitive notions of
what constitutes lawful civilian participation in hostilities. 91
Second, as the armed conflict in Libya showed, a stronger international spotlight shines on NIAC than previously. The legal character of the Libyan conflict is
complex. It is dear that by February 2011, hostilities rose beyond mere riot and
crossed the threshold for armed conflict, resulting in a NlAC for legal purposes. Yet
not long afterward, international intervention on behalf of the rebels in midMarch likely converted portions of the conflict into lAC for the legal purposes of
participating States.92 Whether the situation devolved into two separate conflicts,
an lAC between Libya and the NATO States conducting attacks on one hand, and a
NlAC between the Libyan government and the rebels on the other, is debatable. 9 )
The better view acknowledges each as a separate conflict, notwithstanding practical complications. Either way, media and social networking made the details of
government reactions to civil disturbances and especially the rebel armed groups
instantly public.94 Even the academic legal community responded, producing
near-instantaneous analysis and reactions to the conflict. 9) The information age
appears to have ended the era when States could rely upon the internal nature of
NlAC to shield the nature of their responses from public attention. One wonders
whether the same can long be said with respect to international legal attention.
Third, and finally, the rise of so-called transnational armed conflict may bring
pressure on the government forces status void. "Transnational armed conflict" typically describes armed conflict between a State and non-State actors not confined to
the State's own territOly.'~6 U.S. operations against al-Qaeda since 2001 are often
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cited as an example of transnational armed contlict given their extension beyond
the sites of the original 200 1 attacks to at least four continents. Although oflimited
legal recognition and acceptance among law-of-war experts, transnational armed
contlicts remain related to NlAC in their likely scope of international regulation.
At present they remain, in the most important respect for purposes of conflict classification, non-international. That is, despite crossing international borders, transnational armed conflicts still do not pit two States directly against one another.
Yet the b roader geographic and political scope of transnational armed con flicts
may render increased input from international law attractive to important international legal personalities. Transnational armed conflict greatly strains traditional
territorial or politically based claims of exclusive sovereign prerogative on the part
of the government under attack. Classic, non-extraterritorial NlAC has relied
greatly on traditional notions of territorial sovereignty to fend off international
regulation. With their associated cross-border incursions and movements,
transnational armed conflicts unmoor NIAC from many of its traditional claims to
general freedom from international regulation. To be sure, the soundest approach
looks for such regulation from the traditional sources of international law-the
agreements and binding practices of States. But from a normative perspective,
rights of non-intervention in internal affairs97 and insulation from international
legal meddling seem significantly weaker in transnational armed conflict.
The emerging forms of warfare showcased above reinforce the point. To return
to cyber operations, it appears nearly impossible to conduct an effective, networked cyber attack within the territory of one State.93 For instance, although of
uncertain origin, the denial of service attacks suffered by Estonia in 2007 are estimated to have transited servers and networks located in as many as 178 countries.9'l
Cyber attacks are likely to appear attractive to non-State actors challenging betterresourced government opponents in NIAC. lOO Cyber warfare offers insurgents
anonymity, economy and access to destructive potential often difficult to acquire
with respect to kinetic means. 101 To the extent cyber operations can be expected as
a feature ofNIAC, these con tlicts will continue to involve transnational elements,
such as attacks either originating from the territory of third-party States or at least
transiting servers therein. Government responses to insurgent cyber attacks may
be less than discriminating given the difficulties of cyber attribution. One can easily
foresee false positives leading governments in NIAC to unwittingly attack assets of
neutral third-party States. The temptation to resort to international law of war to
regulate such events, to the extent they are not already regulated in the jus ad
bellum and law of State responsibility, may be great.
Ultimately, the effect of each of these phenomena of modern armed conflictmixing of traditional missions, increasingly available information on how States
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conduct NIAC and the enlarged geographic scope ofNlAC-is likely to be heightened scrutiny of State responses to NIAC. If, as the prior section asserted, State responses have largely conformed to tradition, modern conflict's demand for
interagency responses will likely involve actors not traditionally associated with
direct participation in NlAC. If States could formerly rely on the fog of war and
geographic borders to obscure the details of how and with whom they carried out
military operations, the networked world will certainly make their practices and
tactics apparent and subject to scrutiny. And if the previously internal nature of
NIAC permitted States to defend claims of sovereign prerogative, the increasingly
transnational nature ofNIAC will surely increase pressure to internationalize the
applicable legal regime, perhaps even with respect to status.

Re-examining Status in NIAC
The extent to which one concludes the international law ofNIAC regulates the status
and composition of government forces may be a function of the level oflegal generality at which one operates. As demonstrated above, the positivist claim to international regulation of the topic is weak. Certainly, no specific treaty provisions
address the subject directly. Nor does one find extensive signs of State consent to
international regulation of the topic through recitation of custom or litigation generally. Yet drawing back to the level of principles, one might find evidence to undermine the voids previously described. Paired with looser interpretive practices,
such as giving tangible effect to the perceived objects and purposes of such legal
norms, a colorable case for limits on government forces in NIAC emerges.I02 This
section examines briefly the case for principle-derived international law limits on
State participation in NlAC similar to the status-based limits found in lAC.
The principle of distinction has been called "the grandfather of all principles" of
the law of armed conflict.101 Enumerated alternately as "distinction"lG4 or "discrimination," los in both practice and custom warriors have long recognized the
principle. Distinction's first clear codification appeared in one of the founding
documents of the law of armed conflict. The U.s. Lieber Instructions, drafted in
1863, state:
[AJs civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily
advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual
belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The
principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be
spared in person, property, and honor as much as theexigenciesofwar will admit. 106
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The modern international law of armed conmct expresses the principle similarly in Additional Protocol I, Article 48, titled appropriately "The Basic Rule. "I07
Most frequently, distinction operates on the targeting practices of combatants,
restricting lawful attacks to legitimate military objectives and enemy combatants
and fighters. lOS Distinction fo rbids attacks on civilians not participating directly in
hostilities and on civilian objects.I09 The principle also forbids attacks producing
effects that cannot be contained or limited to their intended targets. IIO
Beyond limiting attacks and their effects to lawful targets, distinction also comprises combatants' duty to distinguish t}[ernse/ves from civilians. Located among
the Additional Protocol I provisions related to prisoner-of-war and combatan t
statuses, Article 44 requires that combatants "distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack."lll Historically, combatants have satisfied this aspect of
distinction by setting themselves apart from civilians both spatially and in appearance. Uniforms and the practice of carrying arms openly, combined with tactics involving tight fonnations and relatively confined battlefields, formerly made
distinction a relatively simple matter. Recognizing modern practices of militia and
other organized resistance movements in twentieth-century warfare, however, Article 44 pennits combatants to derogate from distinguishing themselves in the traditional manner in some insta nces. Under Article 44, in occupied territory and
wars of national liberation, unconventional combatants need merely carry arms
openly d uring and in preparation for attacks. l12 Relaxing the unifonn and insignia
aspects of the distinction requirement, Article 44 proved one of the most contentious provisions of Protocol I. II) Yet the general duty for participants in hostilities
to distinguish themselves clearly during combat persists.
Addressed more squarely to targeting operations than status, Additional Protocoli , Article 58 outlines precautions against attacks and reinforces the second aspect of the principle of distinction. II ~ Article 58 generally requires that parties
remove or separate civilians located in their own territories from likely military
objectives. Commentary to the rule clarifies its intent also to prevent construction
of military buildings near civilian populations and objects. liS The rule's relationship to distinction lies in its facilitation of attackers' efforts to obselVe the principle themselves. In some sense, Article 58 responds to critiques that the targeting
provisions of Additional Protocol I focus too narrowly on attackers. lIt> Law-of-war
experts have obselVed that in many targeting scenarios, the defender or object of
attack is better positioned to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage to civilian objects. 117 Though perhaps not to the entire satisfaction of Protocol I critics,
Article 58 remedies a portion of the supposed misallocation of the distinction
burden.
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Carried to its logical conclusion, the above conception of distinction, in both
lAC and NlAC,II! can be understood to carry an implicit limitation on the categories of government actors authorized to take part in hostilities. In NlAC, government use of agencies or actors indistinguishable from the civilian population or
from government agencies not participating directly in hostilities frus trates insurgents' efforts to observe the principle of distinction in their attacks. For instance,
co-location of an interagency intelligence analysis cell with other civilian agency
assets not engaged in a NIAC effort might frustrate discriminate attacks on the former. More important, widespread use of personne1 from civilian government
agencies to cond uct hostilities in NIAC could easily induce insurgent forces to regard all civilian government personnel as hostile, even those not actually taking direct part in attacks.
As critics of Additional Protocol I observe, the defender, in this case the de jure
government, is usually better positioned to prevent harm to civilians. Either by
clearly identifying persons taking direct part in hostilities on behalf of the
government or by restricting such activities to members of the armed forces, the
government could greatly aid efforts to ensure discriminate attacks. Under the
proposed principle-based rule, any contrary course of action would be characterized as inconsistent with the principle of distinction or at least inconsistent with
its object and purpose.
Such a rule might easily translate into a status-like conception for NlAC. Although NlAC generally rejects the use of status to apportion authority and protection, a distinction-derived rule limiting participation in hostilities to members of
the government armed forces might operate similarly to a status-based rule. In
practical terms, the rule would create two categories of persons in NIAC: those
whose direct participation does not frustrate the principle of distinction and those
whose direct participation in hostilities violates the principle. Such bifurcations are
entirely parallel to the status-based legal regime of lAC in important respects, lacking only the familiar taxonomy of combatant and civilian.
Finally, in addition to the rule's logical connection to the most important
principle of the law of war, proponents might point to recent trends toward parity between the international law of lAC and that ofNIAC. The very late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries have seen an expansion of international instruments applicable in NlAC as well as extensions of existing lAC treaties into NIAC.
Major treaties expanded to cover NIAC include the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
Convention;119 the1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, including its five
protocols;120 the 1997 Ottawa Landmines Convention;121 the 1993 Chemical
WeaponsConvention;122 and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. J2} Additionally, 11 8 States have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
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Court, which includes a highly developed article of war crimes in NlAC124 Beyond
application of the technical provisions of these treaties, such expansions might signal
an important erosion of State hostility toward international regulation of the conduct of hostilities in NIAC
In sum, attractive logical, h umanitarian and even mildly positivist cases might
be made for status-like limits on governmen t forces participating in NIAC For
purposes of argument, this section im agines a d istinction-derived rule that would,
as some consider is the case in lAC, limit direct participation in hostilities in NlAC
to armed forces or m ilitia similarly organized and belonging to a party to the confli ct.12S In fact, a recent book dedicated to the topic of combatant status in NIAC asserts as much, arguing, "By definition, any person who participates in an internal
armed conflict who is not a member of the states' armed forces is an 'unlawful'
combatant-that is, a person who is not immunized for their warlike acts."126 Despite apparent humanitarian payouts, the imagined rule runs afoul of important
structural and technical facets of the law of war. Logical, structural and practical
reasons counsel against recognition of the rule as lex lata and perhaps even as lex

ferenda .
First among logical objections, the distinction-derived rule proves too much.
The logic of the proposed rule would extend to practically absurd conclusions. For
example, the appearances of some non-military governmen t actors in NIAC would
not frustrate the p rinciple of distinction . Many States' domestic security forces
would appear to most observers as combatants. Few, if any, N IAC fighters could
claim to have been misled by the uniforms, armaments and even vehicles used by
such actors despite their non-military character. Yet because they are not actually
armed forces or, alternatively, not subject to a system of command and internal
discipline they would be excluded from conducting hostilities under the supposed
rule. The same might easily be said of private security contractors employed by
States in NIAC For all the complexities PSCs have introduced to the modern battlefield, confusion with innocent civilians is not typically among them.127
Additionally, a blanket rule limiting government conduct of hostilities in NlAC
to members of the armed forces would extend beyond situations that implicate the
appearance of the hostile actor at all. So-called over-the-horizon or non-line-ofsight attacks seem not to provoke concern that the attacker distinguish him- o r herself through visual means. In this respect, there is great danger that the distinctionderived rule would operate too broadly in a logical sense. That is, application of a
rule requiring the wearing or display of distinctive insignia or uniforms ap plied to
over-the-horizon warfare fails to serve the rule's intended purpose of facilitating
the defender's efforts to distinguish attackers from innocent, non-hostile parties.
Limiting the conduct of attacks to m embers o f the armed fo rces in such
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circumstances amounts at least to empty formalism-and at worst to absurdityhannful to the reputation and perceived legitimacy of the law of war.
As related above, the material field of application of a number of important international law-of-war instruments has recently been expanded to NlAC. By their
terms, these treaties fonnerly regulated only lAC. Previously, their extension to
NlAC could only be achieved by proof of customary status-a technique fraught
with ambiguity and subject to vexing caveat. It may be, as previously observed, that
these expansions reflect a reduction of State hostility to international regulation of
NIAC. Yet closer examination suggests evidence of a more restrained enthusiasm
for international regulation ofNIAC.
With the notable exception of the Rome Statute, each of the treaties recently expanded to cover NIAC concerns means and methods of warfare. They are primarily weapons treaties consistent with the Hague tradition of the law of war. us
Weapons treaties have long been an exception to the use of status to apportion protection in lAC. In contrast to the instruments of the so-called Geneva or "respect
and protect" tradition, weapons treaties associated with the Hague tradition have
operated universally, benefiting both combatants and civilians, though typically in
a collateral sense with respect to the latter. Weapons treaties usually do not concern
interpersonal interactions or the control of individuals and have not been a source
of protected or privileged status under the law of war. None of the expanded treaties introduces to NIAC a new or protected status. While certainly humanitarian
advances and arguably a boon to the prospect of international regulation of NIAC,
the recent expansions actually reflect no alternation whatsoever to the general
dearth of status-based regulation in NlAC. The larger significance of these expansions may not be general State willingness to submit to international regulation of
NIAC, but rather recognition of the near-perfect alignment of concern for unnecessary suffering produced by certain classes of weapons in both lAC and NlAC.
By contrast, the Rome Statute's significant NlAC jurisdictional grant to the International Criminal Court (ICC) spans both traditions of the law of war. The
NIAC-relevant portions of the Rome Statute undoubtedly represent a significant
concession to the international legal system. And other international tribunals
share the ICC's broad authority with respect to conduct in NIAC. I29 Yet the extent
to which the mandates of these tribunals reflect willingness to commit NIAC to the
international legal system should not be overstated. First, it should be remembered
that the jurisdiction of the ICC, through the principle of complementarity, takes a
backseat to domestic proceedings. no States willing and able to hear claims arising
from participation in NIAC in their own courts preempt ICC jurisdiction.
Complementarity stands as a powerful bar to international intrusion into NIAC.
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Second, the most legally significant outcomes of the decisions at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY) have been achieved
only through controversially broad outlooks on the scope of customary law applicable to NlAC. None is better illustrative than the IcrY decision in Prosecutor v.
Tadii, in which the Appeals Chamber observed that the distinction between lAC
and NIAC had lost much of its value and weight. 1l1 The Trib unal's observation is
only defensible under the least rigorous conceptions of customary international
law. Applied to the nationals of minor powers, involved in unquestionably inhumane conduct, the Appeals Chamber's observation attracted only minor protest.
One wonders whether applied to agents of more influential international actors,
and to less obviously atrocious circumstances, the Chamber's bold pronouncement would have weathered as well.
Third, and most important, it should be understood that criminal trib unals deal
with conduct, as distinct from status. For the tribunals, status is examined solely
for the purposes of evaluating jurisdiction or determining whether charged conduct satisfies the elements of an enumerated offense. For instance, a tribunal vested
with jurisdiction to hear grave breaches of the Third Geneva Convention must
determine whether any alleged victims held the status of prisoner of war as understood by that Convention.132 Similarly, grave breaches of the Fourth Convention
require that purported victims be protected persons as defined by Article 4 of that
Convention. m Criminal tribunals do not resolve questions of status for their own
sake or for such inherently political purposes as determining the legitimacy of participation itself. None of the tribunals has litigated status as such or at least in the
sense applied by this chapter. Despite a rich jurisprudence concerning NlAC, no
international case has examined status of any figh ter with respect to lawfulness of
mere participation. Claims advancing a distinction-derived rule on government
participation in hostilities in NIAC likely confuse conduct with status.
The preceding argument illustrates a critical point, namely, the function of
status. Status is instrumental; it is an intermediary fo r larger, more meaningful
legal outcomes. Under the laws of war, status confers protection, treatment, obligations and, in the case of combatants, a limited form of immunity from prosecution. While protection from hostilities, treatment standards upon capture and
other obligations concerning handling of captured combatants share an essentially humanitarian impetus, immunity remains an end distinct from the humanitarian status-derived ends. Immunity is quintessentially political. Immunity
from prosecution for participation in hostilities and the derivative rule limiting
the classes of persons who may claim immunity lie at the heart of sovereignty. If
status is conceived as a gateway to immunity, then it is true that in NlAC "status
is the prize for which fighting is waged. "134 The suggestion, such as that advanced
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by the distinction-derived rule on government forces in NIAC that States would
surrender the ultimate prize of revolutionary war to the international legal system, is severely at odds with both the historical experience of NIAC, and their
clearest self-interest. In terms of logical argument, conceiving status in NIAC as a
means to lawful participation begs the question of the conflict itself. Only if status
is conceived as an instrumentality to purely humanitarian ends can it be fairly
said to operate at all with respect to government forces in NIAC.
From a still wider perspective, it is difficult to reconcile serious claims of lACNIAC parity with the positivist record. I)SAs emphasized above, States have consistently, by compelling majorities, rebuffed invitations to drop the IAC-NIAC distinction in law-of-war treaties. 1)6 Even where States have consented to overlapping
norms, they have made critical caveats. The Martens clause made an early appearance in the Hague Conventions and has reappeared in nearly every major law-ofwar instrument since. An eponymous homage to an influential Russian diplomat,
the clause first resolved an impasse of the treatment of resistance fighters during
belligerent occupation by referring to the common law of war and to more general
norms of humanitarian treatment. m Since then, the clause has served the function
in treaties of holding a place for the customary law of war, and also as a sort of residual clause for the operation of peacetime humanitarian norms.
While the clause appears in the NlAC-specific Additional Protocol II of 1977, it
bears crucial alterations to its traditional form.138 The Protocol II iteration excludes reference to "law of nations"l"internationallaw" and "established custom."1)9 Also omitted is the traditional reference to "usages established among
civilized peoples."I40 Academic commentary to Additional Protocol II indicates
these were deliberate omissions, intended to honor States' historical re1uctance to
commit NlAC to intemationallaw. 141 As is plain, each omission shares with the
others reference to the international legal system. A clearer desire to keep international norms at bay in NIAC is difficult to conjure. That States would in the
modern period of positive law-of-war development require alterations to such a
wide1y accepted and fundamental precept of the law of lAC certainly bears witness
to the persistence of the IAC-NlAC divide.
To be sure, some lAC norms transpose easily to NlAC. International tribunals
and respected non-governmental and academic studies have made compelling
cases to close the substantive legal gap between the two recognized conflict types. 142
For instance, minimal treatment standards for persons in custody applicable in
lAC present few, if any, NIAC-specific obstacles to military or political necessity.
But even if many lAC norms transpose easily, status does not appear to be one of
them. Although a certain parity between treatment obligations and protections in
lAC and NIAC can be conceded, it is worth noting that status has not made the leap
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between two conflict types. Conferral of status, even as a humanitarian instrumentality, has proved the point where State willingness to level the law of lAC and that
of NlAC ends. The issue remains of sufficient political importance to NIAC to
withstand even the considerable aforementioned pressures on the existing NlAC
status void.
Finally, and aside from descriptive debates, calls for leveling the international
law of NIAC with that of lAC fail to make the normative case that international
law is the best answer to perceived problems in NlAC. Typically claims that lAC
norms have migrated to NlAC appeal to strong humanitarian logic. How could
persons, especially victims of hostilities, be less deserving of protection simply by
virtue of conflict classification? While compelling on some levels, these claims fail
to appreciate the entire calculus of commitment of an issue to the international
legal system. Commitments to international law reflect not only normatively desirable outcomes, but also the judgment of States that such outcomes are best
achieved collectively rather than independently. No single theory ofinternational
law prescribes a comprehensive formula for such determinations. States appear to
make such determinations on an ad hoc basis, balancing multiple and dynamic
variables.
Since the late nineteenth cent ury, States have judged international law as a good
fit fo r international armed conflict largely by virtue of the identities of the actors.
Coincidence of interests and guarantees of reciprocity continue to inform the international bargains struck through treaties. By definition, the parties to NlAC upset the logic of this prescription. Assumptions concerning capacity and willingness
to observe internationally based legal obligations do not migrate fro m lAC to
NlAC as easily as rules themselves. Moreover, domestic legal systems' implementations of international law are often imperfect. Legal nuances are often lost in translation, frustrating expectations of uniformity and universality. Hard-won bargains
at diplomatic conferences may be selectively or not at all implemented. Considering the inherently internal, sovereign nature of issues in NIAC, the likelihood that
international norms would be implemented to the credit of international law legitimacy seems dim. Finally, modern perceptions of the laws of war themselves may
be part of the problem. Characterizations of the law of war as exclusively humanitarian mislead and present an incomplete picture of its true object and purpose.1 43
While many of the humanitarian aspects of the law of lAC have proved well disposed to migration to NlAC, the use of status generally, and particularly to apportion political outcomes such as immunity, appears to be the current limit of State
willingness to submit to lAC-NlAC legal parity.

164

Sean Watts
Conclusion
As the chapter's opening assertion, a gross generalization to be sure, suggests, internationallawyers' reactions to purported voids in international law coverage
vary greatly according to interpretive preferences and general outlooks on international law. Whatever one's interpretive bent, it seems undeniable that positive
voids in international law no longer mean what they used to. Substantive gaps in
treaty coverage seem to represent neither the end of descriptive debate, nor the
beginning of the end, but only perhaps the end of the beginning of such discussions. l44 In addition to the possibilities of international custom, theories accepting a proliferation of "international lawmakers" now include suggestions that
non-State actors might form international law, greatly increasing the likelihood
that perceived voids will be filled to the satisfaction of interpretivist schools of
thoUght. 14S The signs are all around that if the NIAC status void is to remain in effect it will have to be defended rather than assumed.
With respect to the status of government forces in NlAC a distinction-derived
rule limiting government forces' participation in hostilities explored in this chapter
is more than a rhetorical straw man. Accepting evolution in NIAC, the prospect of
international regulation appears highly possible. In addition to changes in internationallaw interpretive theory, evolutions in State military doctrine applicable to
NlAC and increased popular attention tohow NIAC is waged by States provide fertile ground for transplanting lAC nonns into NIAC.
Despite their shortcomings, jus in bello treaties have been highly successful at
humanizing lAC. The desire to import such success to NlAC is both laudable and
understandable. Yet voids are not in all cases invitations to interpretive gap-filling.
Voids are, as in the case of status in NlAC, often reflections of States' general outlook on the propriety and likely efficacy of international regulation. To preserve
the legitimacy of the law of war generally, a sound and principled methodology is
needed to regulate the migration of norms from lAC to NIAC.
It may be fair to say the jus in bello is under-theorized and thus not up to the task.
Compared to domestic legal regimes, international law generally and even its legal
sibling the jlls ad bellum, the law governing the conduct of hostilities lacks a deliberate and well-defended interpretive theory. One finds far greater attention to
compliance theory in jus ad bellum than jus in bello. l46 That law-of-war specialists
haven't paid particular attention to interpretive theory is to some extent forgivable.
The pressing practicalities of its relevance, the life-and-death implications of its
operation, and the still unsorted doctrinal and descriptive challenges a re enough to
occupy a career. However, in addition to the possibility of resolving a pressing
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doctrinal question, the NIAC status void may offer an opportunity to spark more
deliberate discussion of interpretive theory in the jus it! bello.
The temptation to address voids from a purely humanitarian perspective can be
great. Yet purely moral reasoning fails to account for the current positive disparities between the law of lAC and that of NlAC. Ultimately, deliberate and p rincipled
interpretive efforts, such as this chapter has endeavored to provide, present the
more promising course, unveiling areas of potential progress, while sustaining the
underlying logic and nature of the current international legal system.
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has provoked significant legal debate. A strong textual case can be made that no such separate,
treaty.based status exists. See Mark Maxwell & Sean Watts, Unlawful Enemy Combatant: Status,
Theory of Culpability, or Neither?, JOURNAl OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (2007)
(concluding U.S. use of th e term " un1 awful enemy combatant~ reflects legal convenience more
th an objective assessment of the existing laws and customs of war ); DOrmann, supra note 20, at
46-47 (em phasizing that neither term appears in the 1949 Geneva Conventions). But su
DINSTEIN, supra note 19, at 33-36 (defending, in one of the most respected texts on the jus in
btllo, recogni tion of the class of unlawfu1 combatant).
26. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadif, supra note 12, '" 164-69 (announcing surprising legal find·
ings on Fourth Geneva Convention protected. person status).
27. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAw OF ARMED
CONFLlcr , 15.6.1 (2004) (stating, "The law relating to internal anned conflict does not deal spe·
cifically with combatant status or membership of the anned forces") (hereinafter UK LOAC
MAN UAL]; SOLIS, supra note 4, at 191 (observing, "[Tj here are no 'combatants,' lawful or otherwise, in Common Article 3 conflicts~).
28. Additional Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 5.
29. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4 , art. 43(2) (stating, "Members of the anned
forces of a Party to a conflict . .. are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate
directly in hostilities~) (parenthetical omitted).
30. Codified pro tection of prisoners and the status of prisoner of war date back to some
of the earliest multilaterallaw-of-war ins truments. See Lieber Code, supra note 5, arts. 5356; PRO/ECf OF AN INTERNATIONAL DECL\RATION CONCERNING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF WAR arts. 23-34 (Aug. 27, 1874), availilble at http://www.icrc.orglihLnsf/INTRO/135
?OpenDocumentj Institute ofInternational Law, Oxford Manual 1880: The Laws ofWar on Land,
reprinted in Schindler &Toman, supra note 5, at 29, arts. 61-72; Hague Convention (II ) Respect·
ing th e Laws and Customs of War on Land with Annex of Regulations arts. 4-20, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, I Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention II ].
31. Not all prisoners of war enjoy combatant immunity. For instance, while "warcorrespon.
dents, su pply contractors, and membersoflaborunits" who accom pany the armed forces q ual ify
for prisoner-of.war stat us, few if any detaining powers would be likely to afford combatant im·
m unity in the even t they took a direct part in hostilities. 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note
3, art. 4.A(4). This view accords with the inclusion of these gro ups in the law-of-war definition of
civilian. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50.
32. Writers have adopted the term "fighters" to describe persons taking direct part in NIAC
hostilities, whether government or rebel. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B.
GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFlICf WITH COMMENTARY 1 LL2 (2006) [hereinafter NIAC MANUAL]; I CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw rule 6 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck
eels., 2005) (omitt ing entirely reference 10 non-international armed conflict in rules governing
"Combatants and Prisoners-of-War") [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANI·
TARIAN LAW] .
33. See NIAC MANUAL, supra note 32, 3.6 (o utlin ing min imal prolections afforded to
"[p]ersons whose liberty has been restricted"); UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, 15.6.3; Mi·
chael N. Schmitt, The Status ofOpfX1sition Fighters iTI a Non-International Armed Conflict, which
is Cha pter VI in th is volume, at 119.
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34. See UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, 15.34-15.56 (reviewing rules added to the law
of NIAC by Protocol II without mention of prisoner·of-war status).
35. Additional Protocol II , supra no te 17, art. 5. Article 6 echoes th is reluctance, referring to
"those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. n Id., art. 6.
36. See 1949 Geneva Convention Ill, supra note 3, art. 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note
17, art. 5. An increasing n umber of international lawye rs view international human rights la w
(IHRL) as applicable or at least complementary to the law o f war. See RENE PROVOST,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAw (2002); Fran~ise 1- Hampson, The

Reiatiornhip between IntenuHional Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspectiveofa Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 549 (2008);
Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 501 (2008); Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights arId Humanitarian
Law, 31 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 935 (1982). Pa rticula rly given th e terri torial
nature ofN IAC, many wo uld regard IHRLas a so urce of treatment obligations in NIAC. None·
theless, this chapter focuses exclusively on protections derived from the law of war.
37. By comparison, in lAC anned gro ups not part of States' regular anned forces can gain
prisoner-of-war status for their members by complying with criteria enumerated in the Third
Geneva Convention: belonging to a party, submitting to a command hierarchy, bearing arms
openly, wearing distinctive insignia and observing the laws of war. See 1949 Geneva Conve ntion
III , supra note 3, art. 4.A(2).
38. See EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFllCTS ch. 5, 256-70 (2008)
(outJ ining domestic p rosecutions arising from NlACs); NlAC MANUAL, supra note 32, 1 3.7
(outJining d ue process obliga tions applicable to domestic prosecution for "crime[s[ related to
the hostilities"); THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 1202.3 (Dieter
Flecked., 2008) (noting States' interest in prosecution of insurgents' acts of murder and destruction in NIAC) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW[ .
39. Additional Protocol II, supra note 17, art. 6(5). Commentary interprets the clause as in·
tended to promote general reconciliation rather than to recognize or effectuate any right to im·
m uni ty or amnesty held by ca ptured fighters. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITlONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1402 (Yves Sandoz,
Christophe Swinarski & Bru no Zimmennann eds., 1987) [hereinaft er COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITlONAL PROTOCOLS] .
40. The most widely applicable stan da rd for combatant status is found among select provi.
sions of the Third Geneva Convention's categories of prisoner of wa r. In an ironic twist, the
LOAC defini tion of civilian identifies four categories of prisoner of war as constituting the com·
batant class in lAC. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 50. For its States parties, Additional Protocol I refines in Articles 43 and 44 the criteria for combatan t status. Combatant status
under Protocol I is commonly understood to require onl y affiliation with an anned force or
group which employs a system of discipline enforcing compliance with LOAC and carrying
one's arms openly in attack. See id. The Protocol's elimination of the criterion of distinctive insignia or a unifonn has been widely criticized. See Douglas Fei th, Law in the Service of TerrorThe Strange Case ofAdditi011al Protocol I, I THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36 (1985); Guy B. Roberts,
The Nf!W Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 ( 1985); Abraham Sofaer, Terrorism and the
Law, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 901 (1986). Alth ough a persistent objector to some of Additional Pro·
tocol I, the United States regards significant portions of the Protocol as reflective of customary
law. See Memorandum from W. Hayes Parks eI al. to Mr. John H. McNeill, Assistant General
Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 19n Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions:
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Customary International Law Im plications (May 9, 1986), reprinted in THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DocUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 388, 389
(Sean Watts ed., 20(6); Michael J. Matheson, Remarks in Session One: The United States Position
on theRe/arion ofCustomnry lntemntionnl Law to tire 1977 ProtocoIsAdditiorral to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UN IVERSIIT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 419, 425
(1987).
41. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, ch. 15; OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAl,
CHIEF Of DEfENCE STAfF, JOINT DocrRlNE MANUAL, LAw Of ARMED CONfLlCf AT THE
OPERATIONAL AND TACflCAL LEVELS ch. 17 (2001) [hereinafter CANADIAN LOAC MANUALJ.
The German law of armed conflict manual does not treat NlAC in detail. See FEDERAL MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, HUMANITARES VOLK£RRECHT IN BEWAFFNETEN
KONFLlKTEN- HANDBUCH 210- 11 (1992). The manual simplyinstruclS German armed forces
to apply "fundamental humani tarian provisions of international law embodied in the four
1949 Geneva Conventions (Common Art. 3), the 1954 Cul tural Property Convention (Art. 19)
and th e 1977 Additional Pro tocol I I ~ to NlAC. [d., 211 . Comments by a prominent German
legal expert note tha t the In terna tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia inter·
preted this paragraph as a statement eq uating the law of lAC and NIAC. WolffHeintschel von
Heinegg, TIle Germarr Man ual, in INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FORUM FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AND HUMANrrARlAN LAW, NATIONAL MlUTARY MANUALS ON THE
LAW Of ARMED CONFUCf 112 (Nobuo Hayash i ed., 2d ed. 2010), aVtli/ab/e at http://
www.fich l.orgip ublication·series(citing lnternationalCriminal Tribunal for the fonner Yugo.
slavia, Tadic Jurisdiction Decision1 118). The UK Manual on the Law ofArmed Conflict includes an
interesting historical notation regarding French practice in Algeria. Wh ile French forces
unsurprisingly tried and executed Algerian rebels without according prisoner-of-war status, the
French also expected opposition fighters to accord prisoner-of-war status to ca ptured French
soldiers. UK LOAC MANUAL, supra, 1 15.4.1 n.21 . The current U.S.law-of-war manual includes
only a single paragraph on "civil war,~ th e bulk of which merely reprints Common Article 3 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare
1 11 (1956). A closely held draft of a new U.s. manual is curren tly under review by executive
branch agencies.
42. UK LOAC MANUAL, suprn note 27, 15.6.1; CANADIAN LOAC MANUAL, supra note 41,
11706.1.
43. U.N. Charter art. 2(7). Article 2(7) states, uNoth ing in the present Charter shall autho·
rize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris·
diction of any state. .. . n Id.
44. See UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 27, 1 15.6.1.
45. A prominent law-of-war handbook asserts, A1lstates have lega] frameworks which priv.
ilege their own police and armed forces as against insurgents who oppose them." HAND8ooKOF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, suprn note 38, 1 1202.2. Title 10 of the United States
Code provides legal authority for and organizes the U.s. armed forces. Title 50 organizes em·
ployees of U.S. federal inteUigence agencies. Recent operations, particularly those carried o ut
against global terrorist networks, have blurred the lines of authority between Title 10 and Ti tle 50
agencies. Debate has also developed over other agencies' participation in national security activi·
ties, such as the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency's work in counterterrorism operations. See
Johnny Dwyer, The DEA. 's Terrorist Hunters: Overreaching Their Authority?, TIME-COM (Aug. 8,
2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0.8599.2087220.00.html.
46. See James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fa tal Shot to Hail of Fire to J7 Deaths,
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007 at AI.
U
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47. See Moshe Schwartz, Congressional Research Service, The DepartmentofDefense's US€of
Private &curity Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress (2011 ).
48. Several international criminal tribunals wield jurisdiction over the conduct ofNlAC. See
e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(c)-(f), July 17, 1998,2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (amended Jan. 16,2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] .
49. See GENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 35.
SO. See J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War. Reexamining the Status ofCivilians Accompanying
the Armed Forces, 57 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 155 (2005); Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare:
Computer Network Attack all d the Jus in Bello, in COMPUTER N""lWORK ATIAC K AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 198 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O'Donnell eds., 2002) (VoL 76,
U.S. Naval War College In ternational Law Studies). But S€e Sean Watts, Combatant Status and
Computer NetworkAttack, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (2009) (arguing
th at perceived limits on types of persons and agencies States may employ in computer network
attack are overstated).
51. See W. Hays Parks, Special Forces' WearofNon-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHICAGO JOURNAL
OF INTERNATtONAlLAW 493, SOS-11 (2003) (discussing the criteria (or prisoner-of-war status
and distinguishing entitlement to or loss of status from criminality).
52. LO UIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 253 (1968) (observing thaI Hmost states obey
most iaw most of the time" ).
53. See Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAw
JOURNAL 365 (2009).
54. Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle ullder PTessure, 90
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931 (2008).
55. SeeGENEVA CONVENTION IV COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 6-7. Jean Pictet observes,
"Without [the guarantee] neither Article 3, nor any other Article in its place, would ever have
been adopted." Id. at 44.
56. See 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 3, art. 3.
57. See Waldemar Solf, The Status ofCombatallts ill Non-Illternational Armed Conflicts under Domestic Law and Transllational Practice, 33 AM.ERlCAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 53, 57-58
( 1983) (tracing recognition of combatant status to Belli, Grotius, Pufendorf and Van el).
58. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(3). Article 51(3) states. "Civilians shall enjoy
the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostili ties."
59. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 39, at 514.
60. See DIN STEIN, supra note 19, at 33 (noting lawful combatants' Klicense to kill" ).
61. Early commentat ors viewed skeptically claims that intemational law could authorize or
"give positive sanction to" States to do anything. 2 JOHN WFSfUKf., INTERNATIONAL LAW 52
( 1907) (explaining that rules of war "are always restrictive, never permissive"). See alro Roberts,
supra note 54, at 935 (rejecting that international law grants belligerents the "right" to partici pate
in hostilities); Baxter, supra note 25, at 323-324 (a rguing, wi th characteristic prescience, a simi·
lar point prior 10 the codification of Additional Protocol I).
62. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,30-31 (1942) (finding in international laws of war
support for th e concept of unlawful combatancy); Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10
U.S.c. § 950t( 15) (2009) (defining, for p urposes of U.S. military commissions, the crime of
murder in violation of the law of war, including the otherwise lawful killing of a "privileged
belligerent") .
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63. See George J. Andreopoulos, TIle Age of National Liberation Movements, in THE LAWS
OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON W ARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 191 (Michael Howard, George
J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994). Andreopoulos observes, "The overt
politicization of the symbols of recogni tion, w heth er dealing with rebellion, insurgency, or
belligerency, led to the disappearance of the concern with correlating status with facts .. .. ~ Id.
at 193.
64. On June 6, 1977, the fifty·second plenary meeting of States rejected a committee pro·
posal to incl ude reference to , and definitions of, military objectives into what became Article 13
of Protocol II. IV OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE
REAFFIAAtATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw APPLICABLE IN
ARMED CONFUcrs, GENEVA 1974-1977, at 71 (1978) . Consequently, Additional Protocol 11 in·
cludes no provision on military objective.
65. See, e.g., II·B FINAL RECORDOFTHE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at
9-15 (W illiam S. Hein & Co. 20(4) (1949) [hereinafter 1949 GENEVA CONFERENCE FINAl.
RECORD]; VII OfFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONfERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION
AND DEVELOPMENT Of INTERNATIONAL H UMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED
CONFlICfS, GENEVA 1974-1977, at 60-65 (1 978) (summarizing States' d ivergen t views on the
scope of draft Protocol 11 expressed in Plenary Session).
66. II· B 1949 GENEVA CONfERENCE FINAL RECORD, supra note 65, at 129.
67. CULLEN, supra note 2, at 41-42.
68. [d. at 98,101.
69. See COMMENTARY ONTHE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOlS, supra note 39, at 135Q (noting that
the material application of Protocol 11 does not affect that of Common Article 3). The Protocol's
requirement that opposition groups control territory and its exclusion of conf1icts solely between such groups excludes armed conflicts that Common Article 3 wo uld cover. Additional
Protocol II, supra note 17, art. I.
70. At the diplomatic conference that produced the Additional Protocols, Norway failed in
its attempt to persuade States to drop the distinction between lAC and NIAC. See Hans Peter
Gasser, International Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, mId uimnon, 31 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 911, 912 (1982) (citing 5
D IPLOMATIC CONFERENC£ ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW ApPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS, SUMMARY
RECORD91-99 CD DH /S R.IO (1978».
71. See discussion supported by notes 49-52.
72. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY & H EADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS
COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1 1-2
(2006). The Field Manual notes, "Counterins urgency is military, paramilitary , political, eco·
nomic, psychological, and civic actions taken by agovemment to defeat ins urgency" (citing Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense DictionaryofMilitary andAssoci·
ate<! Tenns 82 (Aug. 15,2011» (emphasis in original).
73. See Nicholas Schmidl e, Getting Bin Wen, NEWYORKER.COM (Aug. 8, 2011), http://
www.newyorker.com/reportingl20 11/08/08/11 0808fa_faccschmidle?currentPage=a1L
74. Seeid.
75. CIA Chief Panetta: Oimma Made ~Gutsy" Decision OIr Bin Laden Roid, PBS NEWSHOUR,
May 3, 2011, http://www.pbs.orginewshourlbb/terrorismljan-junell /panetta_05-03.html.
76. [d.
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77. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630-31 (2006) (holding tha t U.S. operations
against al-Qaeda constituted NIAC for purposes of applica tion of Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions).
78. Scott Shane, CI.A. Is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug.
12, 2011, at AI, availtlble at http://www.nytimes.com120Ilf08/12!worid/asia/12drones.html
?_r=l&pagewanted=print (relating U.s. reb uttals to allegations of widespread civilian casualties
in CIA drone strikes in Pakistan); Charli Carpenter & Lina Shaikho uni, Don't Fror tire Reaper,
FOREIGN POUCY (June 7, 2011 ), http://www.foreignpolicy.comiarticles!20Ilf06/07/dontjear
_the_reaper (noting that a CIA-led drone attack in Pakistan "arguably violates the rul es on law·
fuI combat in the Geneva Conventions").
79. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, TIle Yror of the Drone: An Analysis of
Drone
Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Feb. 24, 2010), http://
counterterrorism.newamerica.netJsites/newamerica.net/files/policydocslbergentiedemann2.pdf.
80. See Schmidle, supra note 73 (relating President Samek Obama's expansion of the ClA.'s
classified drone program); Charlie Savage, U.N. Official Set to Ask U.S. to End C/.A. DrOlle
Strikes, NYTlMES.COM (May 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.comi2010/05128/worid/asia/
28drones.html.
81. J.R. Wilson, UAVs: A Worldwide Rorwdup, More and More Countries Are Developing or
Cooperating on UA Vs as Their Numbers and Versatility Grow, AEROSPACE AMERICA (June 2003),
availtlble at http://www.aiaa.orglaerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=365. Israel used UAVs in the
2006 conflict in Lebanon. See larry Dickerson, New Respect for UA Vs, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECHNOLOGY, Jan. 26, 2009, at 94. UAVs were also used in 2008 between Russia and Georgia in
the South Ossetia region. Id.
82. See Amitai Etzioni, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: The Moral and Legal Case, JOINT FORCE
QUARTERLY, May 2010, at 66, available at http://www.nd u. edulpressllib/images!jfq-57/
etzioni.pdf, Kenneth Anderson, Predators over Pakistan, THE WEEKLY STANDARD,Mar. 8, 2010,
at 24 (defending the Obama administration's global use of CIA. and military drone strikes
against terrorists); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Flying Blind: U.S. Combat Drones Operate Outside International Law, AMERlCA (Mar. 15,2010), http://www.americamagazine.orgfcontent/article
.cfm?artide_id=12179.
83. See Savage, supra note 80 (noting that Philip Alston as United Nations author of a report
on U.S. drone practices agreed th at it is "not per se illegal" for CIA. operatives 10 fire drone mis·
siles); Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extraj udicial, Swnmary o r Arbitrary Executions,
Study on Targeted Killings, 70-71, H wnan Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/1 4124/Add.6
(May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston), available at www2.ohch r.orglenglishlbodieslhrcounciUdocs/
14sessionJA.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf (noting illegality of civilian particip ation in hostilities is no t
addressed by IH L, merely consequences for purposes of targeting and lack o f imm uni ty). Mati
Cover, House Committee Questions Legality of Drone Strikes against Terrorists, eNS NEWS (Apr.
28,2010), http://www.cnsnews.cominode/64916(featuringstatementsby Professor O'Connell
that a drone strike is only legal when used by military personnel in a combal situ ation where
there is an ongoing armed conflict in which the United States is engaged and Professor Glazier, in
conlmst, stating thaI the KUnited States was engaged in an annedconflict with al Qaeda terrorists
around the world" and Uin ternationallegal princi ples . .. justified the use of drones to kill terror·
ists in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond").
84. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3·07, STABILITI OPERATIONS
1-11-1- 13 (2008)
(hereinafter FM 3·07 STABILITY OPERATIONS].
85. General Charles Krulakcoined the term "three-block war" to describe complex conflicts
calling on armed forces to perform a range of missionssimul tanoously. General ChariesC. KruIak,
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Tire Strategic Corporal: Leadership in tire Three Block War, MARINES MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999, at
28. Krulak imagined soldiers in a single urban area engaged in high-intensity combat on one
block, cond ucting humanitarian operations on the next, and separating warring factions on a
third. /d.
86. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (2005).
87. Id.
88. FM 3-07 STABILITY OPERATIONS, supra note 84, app. A.
89. See NATHAN HODGE, ARMED HUMANITARIANS (201 1) (describing recent U.s. experience with nation-b uilding and challenges faced by military leaders adapting to the new mission
set).
90. DEPARTMENT OF DEfENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE 5 (20 1I). The Strategy identifies Utreat[ingJ cyberspace as an operational domain to
organize, tra in, and eq uip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace's potential." Id. See
also DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Q UADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 37 (201O) (which observes,
"Although it is a man-made domain, cyberspace is now as relevan t a domain for DoD activities
as the naturally occ ur ring domains ofland, sea, air, and space"); SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE
HOME DEPARTMENT, CONTEST: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING
TERRORISM 4 1 (2011) (predicting increases in terrorists' use of cyber attack and directing
co unterterrorism assets to integrate responses into planning).
91. The extent and nature of civilian participation in cyber operations, induding attack, are
difficult to discern. States guard their cyber practices and capabilities dosely. Some reliable indicationsex.ist, however, that support the condusion that the United States uses civilians in aspects
of cyber operations approaching or even constituting attack. See Watts, supra note 50, at 407-10
(conduding from public statements and executive branch budget requests that civilians likely
play significant roles in U.S. cyber operations).
92. See Hadeel al-Shalchi & Ryan Lucas, Qaddafi Defiant in the Face of Allied Strikes, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 19, 2011), ht tp://www.csmon itor.com/World/M iddle
-Eastl20IIl0319fQaddafi-defiant-in-the -face-of-allied-strikes; Hadeel a1-Shalchi & Ryan Lucas,
Allies Pormd Libya, CHICAGO SUN-TIMf$, Mar. 20, 2011, at 3 (relating British, French and U.S.
strikes aga inst governmen t forces in Libya).
93. Authors have wri tten on the topic of conflict characterization and conflict parsing in
particular. See Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for Non-lntf!T1latiOllal Armed
Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAw JOURNAL 1042 (20 11 ); Com &
Jensen, supra note 2.
94. See Paul Schemm & Zeina Karam, Gadhafi Drives Rebe/.s from One of Last Strongholds,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 14,2011, at 16; Donald Macintyre, Gaddafi's Iron Fist Won't Help
Him Keep a Gripona DividedNation, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 12,2011 , at24; Paul Schemm &
Maggie Michael, Gadhafi Escalates War on Rebels, CHICAGO SUN-TiMf$, Mar. 7,2011, at4; David
D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Khadafy Forces Hit Key City, Lose Port; Residents Describe Massacre by Army, BoSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 20 11, at I; Leila Fadel & Anthony Faiola, KhaMfy's Forces
Assault Rebe/.s, Protestors, BosrON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2011, at 3 (reporting firing on demonstrators);
Jason Koutsoukis, GadMfi's Forces Unleashed on Rebels, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 3,
2011, at I (reporting alleged government use of mercenaries); Maggie Michael & Paul Schemm,
Gadhafi Fo rces Strike Back, CHICAGO SUN-TIMf$, Feb. 25, 2011, at 25.
95. Michael N. Schmitt, Wings Over Libya: TIle No-Fly Zone in Legal Perspective, 36 YALE
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 45 (2011), available at http://www.yjiLorglonline/
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